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THEORIES  OF  COMPETITION  AND  MARKET  PERFORMANCE 
MULTIMARKET COMPETITION AND THE SOURCE OF POTENTIAl ENTRY 
BY 
ARJEN VAN WITTELOOSTUIJN* 
l  STATIC VERSUS DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY 
The theory of industrial  organization (henceforth IO) studies business policy 
and market performance under specific competitive conditions.  The key con- 
tribution  of  IO  is  the  theory  of  competition.  The  structure-conduct- 
performance  paradigm  describes  the  (reciprocal)  causalities  between  com- 
petitive conditions  (structure),  business policy (conduct)  and market welfare 
(performance). The welfare debate focuses on the trade-off between static and 
dynamic  efficiency  of  partial  market  results, l  Static  efficiency  of  market 
behavior refers to (minimum) average cost pricing, whereas dynamic efficiency 
is concerned with the fact that, for instance, 'new products may be introduced, 
new qualities of existing products may be developed, new methods of produc- 
tion  may be ventured,  new  forms  of industrial  organization,  financing,  or 
tackling risk may be developed' (Kirzner 1985,  p. 30). 
The central proposition is Schumpeter's well-known argument that perfect 
competition undermines the firms' incentives to introduce dynamic economies 
of market behavior. The point is that 'the fundamental impulse that sets and 
keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from the new consumers' goods, 
the new methods of production of transportation,  the new markets, the new 
forms of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates .... A  system 
-  any system, economic or other -  that at every point of time fully utilizes its 
possibilities to the best advantage may yet in the long run be inferior to a system 
that does so at no given point of time, because the latter's failure to do so may 
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1  The efficiency terminology is often used in welfare-theoretic arguments in the theory of in- 
dustrial organization. It is, for example, predominant in Kamien and Schwartz' (1982)  excellent 
survey of the economics of innovation. However, the reader must be aware of the fact that efficien- 
cy in the theory of industrial organization has a meaning which is narrower than the one in welfare 
(particularly general equilibrium) economics (Tirole 1988,  pp.  11-12). ll0  A_ VAN WlTTELOOSTUIJN 
be  a  condition  for  the  level  or  speed  of  long-run  performance ....  But  in 
capitalist reality, as distinguished from its textbook picture, it is not that kind 
of [price] competition which counts but the competition among firms from the 
new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization (the 
largest-scale unit  of control  for instance)  -  competition  which  commands  a 
decisive cost or quality advantage and which strikes not at the margins of the 
profits but at their foundations and their very lives .... It is hardly necessary to 
point out that competition of the kind we now have in mind acts not only when 
in being but also when it is merely an ever-present threat.  It disciplines before 
it attacks' (Schumpeter 1943, pp. 83-85).  This is the static-dynamic efficiency 
trade-off, which serves prominently in the literature on R&D and innovation. 
That is, 'under monopoly, innovation occurs but at a slower pace than is social- 
ly optimal,  whereas  under  perfect competition there  is  none  at  all.  This  of 
course leads to the consideration of the trade-off between perfect competition 
and its static efficiency properties and monopoly, which lacks static efficiency 
but allows for innovation' (Kamien and Schwartz  1982, p.  191). 
This paper serves a twofold purpose. First,  the theoretical literature on the 
static-dynamic efficiency trade-off is reviewed and classified by distinguishing 
three types of competition: pure-contestability, non-contestability and quasi- 
contestability  (Van  Witteloostuijn  1990a).  Second,  a  microfoundation  of 
quasi-contestability  as  a  welfare-theoretic  yardstick  for  the  evaluation  of 
market  performance  is  presented:  a  quest  for  favorable market  conditions 
identifies  sources  of potential  entry that  impose  a  discipline  on  incumbent 
firms' conduct. Note that the paper's terminology is standard in IO: the argu- 
ment  is  framed in  terms  of game theory  (Shapiro  1989,  pp.  125-126).  The 
frame of reference is  a  one (static)  or two-staged (dynamic) noncooperative 
game: in the first stage (ex ante) firms may decide on sunk investment; in the 
second stage (expost) rivals compete for market share. The equilibrium con- 
cepts  are  Nash  for  static  and  subgame  perfection  for  dynamic  games 
(Rasmusen  1989,  pp.  32  and  85,  respectively).  The  paper  is  organized  as 
follows.  Section  2  reviews  and  classifies  theories  of competition.  Section  3 
focuses on static  efficiency by investigating  the  role of sources  of potential 
competition  in  disciplining  pricing  policies  of  incumbent  firms.  Section  4 
studies dynamic efficiency by analyzing entry-deterring investment strategies 
of incumbent firms in the face of a credible entry threat. Section 5 summarizes 
the argument. 
2 THEORIES OF COMPETITION 
2.1  Pure-contestability 
2.1.1  Literature 
The well-established theory of statically efficient rivalry is perfect competition. 
A large number of price-taking producers of a uniform product induces average COMPETITION AND MARKET PERFORMANCE  111 
variable cost pricing if information on prices is perfect (Varian  1984, p.  82). 
Perfect competition resembles Cournot competition under conditions of low 
minimum  efficient scale  and  free entry (Novshek and  Sonnenschein  1987). 
Both models assume a large number of firms. This is not the case with elemen- 
tary Bertrand competition (being associated with assumptions of cost and pro- 
duct  homogeneity,  and  nonbinding  capacity  restrictions).  Elementary 
Bertrand  competition  introduces  statically  efficient price-setting  in  market 
configurations with  only two  incumbent  firms  (Waterson  1984,  p.  25):  the 
crucial assumption is that buyers switch to the lower-priced supplier before the 
higher-priced rival is able to react. 
To date the final generalization of perfect competition is perfect contestabili- 
ty: under conditions of costless exit and free entry even a monopoly operates 
statically (Pareto or Ramsey) efficient (Baumol 1982). Exit is costless and entry 
is free if sunk costs are zero (Shepherd 1984, p. 572). The essential feature of 
a perfectly contestable market is the absence of entry and exit barriers. A con- 
testable market is vulnerable to hit-and-run entry. That is, ' [e]ven a very tran- 
sient opportunity need not be neglected by a potential entrant, for he can go in, 
and,  before prices  change,  collect  his  gains  and  then  depart  without  cost, 
should the climate grow hostile'  (Baumol  1982,  p.  4).  Perfect contestability 
describes Bertrand competition with potential rathor than actual rivalry. 
Schwartz  (1986)  nicely summarizes  the  implications  of a  pervasive entry 
threat. He argues that 'the threat of new entry may be sufficient to discipline 
incumbent  firms.  In the extreme, benchmark case of perfect contestability, 
threat of entry ensures satisfactory performance regardless of the size distribu- 
tion of incumbent firms and regardless of any oligopolistic interactions among 
them .... To prevent costless hit-and-run entry incumbents must set price where 
average cost intersects market demand, which maximizes welfare subject to a 
breakeven constraint'  (Schwartz  1986,  pp.  37-38).  So, perfect contestability 
implies static efficiency. Perfect contestability embodies perfect competition as 
a special case, since average variable cost pricing is the equilibrium strategy ir- 
respective of market structure. 
Immediately following Baumol's (1982) address a barrage of questions arose 
regarding the merits and robustness of the concept of (perfect) contestability 
(Brock 1983; Spence 1983; Schwartz and Reynolds 1983; Weitzman 1983; and 
Shepherd 1984). The purport of the critique is that perfect contestability only 
represents an 'odd special case' (Shepherd 1984, p. 577). The argument is that 
the  first-best  results  are  generated  on the  basis  of very special (restrictive) 
assumptions,  in particular with regard to zero sunk cost (Shepherd 1984,  p. 
577)  and  entry and  exit lags  (Schwartz and  Reynolds  1983,  p.  488).  Brock 
(1983) clarifies matters by asserting that 'Dixit (1982), for example, has argued 
that the economic conditions that must be present for perfect contestability to 
exist ... are extremely stringent: (i) all producers must have access to the same 
technology, (ii) this technology may have scale economies such as fixed costs, 
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with a nonzero time lag, and (iv) consumers must respond to price differences 
with a shorter lag. Baumol et al.  (1983) argue that iii and iv are not needed if 
entrants can write firm contracts with consumers for delivery over some fixed 
period length t' (Brock 1983, p.  1057). That is, the criticism is that perfect con- 
testability relies on restrictive assumptions  of firms' homogeneity, zero sunk 
cost and Bertrand conjectures. 
2.1.2  Game 
The  four  theories  of statically  efficient  competition  -  perfect  competition, 
large-number Cournot  competition,  elementary Bertrand rivalry and perfect 
contestability  -  can  be  denoted  pure-contestability.  Essentially,  pure- 
contestability  describes  a  static  (one-shot)  Bertrand  game  (Knieps  and 
Vogelsang 1982): the assumption of zero sunk investment implies that the first 
stage of the game is empty. An example of the expost game for market share 
is summarized in Table 1 (where P is price, i incumbent firm, e potential entrant 
and A  average variable cost). A  cell depicts the profit combination (hi, rre) per 
strategy pair. 
It immediately follows that the combination of incumbent  firms' average 
variable cost pricing (pi= V) and potential entrants' non-entry (pe>_  ei) is the 
unique Nash equilibrium if incumbent firms (weakly) prefer zero-profit pro- 
duction to exit (Grossman 1981,  p.  1159).  This is true for both the sequential 
(incumbent firms announce price first) and the simultaneous (incumbent firms 
and potential entrants decide on price whilst being unaware of the rivals' pric- 
ing policy) game. 
2.1.3  Performance 
Pure-contestability gives static efficiency. For the evaluation of dynamic per- 
formance the  condition  that  sunk  costs  are  zero  is  particularly  important. 
Shepherd  (1984) notes that sunk (exit) 'costs include many categories besides 
physical capital, such as R&D, advertising to establish brand loyalty, and train- 
ing to create special workers' skills. These intangible forms are often more fully 
'sunk' than physical capital, which can be leased or resold' (Shepherd 1984, p. 
580).  For example,  R&D outlays are an important type of sunk investment. 
Stiglitz  (1987)  argues  that  '[m]ost expenditures  on  R&D  are,  by their  very 
nature, sunk costs. The resources spent on a scientist to do research cannot be 
recovered (Stiglitz 1987, p. 928).  This means that pure-contestability does not 
take  account  of  important  dynamic  economies  of  market  performance: 
TABLE  1 -  PURE-CONTESTABILITY 
Potential entrant 
pe ~ pi  pe < pi 
Incumbent firm  pi> V  (+, 0)  (-, +) 
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although static efficiency is induced,  dynamic efficiency lies beyond the scope 
of the analysis as sunk costs are assumed to be zero. 
2.2  Non-contestability 
2.2.1  Literature 
Dynamic economies of market behavior are inextricably bound up with sunk 
costs. However, the literature argues that a positive sunk cost introduces an en- 
try barrier (Baumol and Willig 1981; Grossman 1981;  Baumol et al.  1982; Far- 
rell  1986;  Stiglitz  1987;  Dasgupta and Stiglitz  1988;  and Martin  1989).  Sunk 
costs follow from the part of capital which is unrecoupable (that is, which has 
zero selling value) outside the market in which the products that are produced 
with the capital involved are sold. Broadly speaking, sunk costs follow from ir- 
reversible  investment in specific  capital (Caves and Porter  1977;  and Martin 
!989). However, it is precisely irreversible investment (or, commitment) which 
raises entry barriers (Dixit 1982). Stigler (1968) defines entry barriers as 'a cost 
of producing (at some or every rate of output) which must be borne by a firm 
which  seeks to enter an industry but is not borne by firms already in the in- 
dustry' (Stigler 1968, p. 67). Examples of entry barriers (Gilbert 1989) are ab- 
solute cost advantages (through the introduction of process innovations), scale 
economies (via the instalment of overcapacity) and product differentiation (as 
a result of advertising campaigns). 
This means that a positive sunk cost raises an entry barrier if potential en- 
trants have not yet sunk the cost necessary to eliminate (technology, capacity, 
goodwill or whatever) disadvantages relative to the incumbent firms. That is, 
'it  is  the  sunk  costs  rather  than  fixed  costs  which  may deter  entry.  This  is 
because if one firm 'sinks' some costs, then its (expost) average cost of produc- 
tion is lower than firms which have not yet sunk costs' (Grossman 1981,  pp. 
1170-1171).  Entry barriers,  in  their turn,  are  a  necessary condition  for im- 
perfect competition. Along the lines of Stigler (1968, p.  16) Waterson (1984, p. 
56)  argues  that  '[b]ehind  protecting  entry  barriers  monopolistic  and 
oligopolistic rivalry may yield a positive profit.' (An exception is the elemen- 
tary Bertrand  model,  which  describe a  price war that drives profits down to 
zero.) 
2.2.2  Game 
The  theories  of  statically  inefficient  competition  can  be  denoted  as  non- 
contestability. The crucial feature of non-contestability is the incumbent firms' 
sunk cost advantage that raises entry barriers. Broadly speaking, commitment 
through sunk investment transforms the static game (Table 1) into a dynamic 
(two-shot)  game (Dixit  1982).  Incumbent firms can exploit a  first-mover ad- 
vantage:  in  the  first  stage incumbent  firms  decide  on  sunk  investment  (S), 
whereas in the second stage potential entrants consider entry. It is essential that 
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decide on commitment before potential entrants sink entry costs. The incum- 
bent firms' ex ante sunk investment si> 0 forces entrants to sink S e expost in 
order to match the incumbent firms'  first-mover advantages.  Figure  1 sum- 
marizes an exemplary two-staged commitment game for a duopoly, assuming 
free entry (S e = 0) for si= O, monopoly profit M  and post-entry (duopoly) pro- 
fit D. 
The sunk investment is a profitable entry-deterring device if M-Si>D  i, m- 
Si>O, De>O and De-se<o:  the combination of entry deterrence (si>0) and 
non-entry (se= 0) is the unique perfect equilibrium. (Note that superiority of 
incumbent firms may imply that se> si.) The literature (Gilbert 1989) focuses 
on the study of profitable commitments (determining the size and content of 
entry-deterring investment S i) and credible threats of post-entry competition 
(fixing the height of post-entry profits D i and De). 
2.2.3  Performance 
Entry barriers have a significant impact on market performance (Bain 1956). 
The implications of entry barriers for market performance cannot be establish- 
ed in a straightforward way. For example, Schmalensee (1988) points out that 
(cf. Gilbert 1989, pp. 528-530) 'formal models of imperfect competition rarely 
generate unambiguous welfare conclusions. In such models, feasible policy op- 
tions usually involve movements to ward but not to perfect competition, so that 
welfare analysis involves second-best comparisons among distorted equilibria. 
In particular,  there is no guarantee that making markets  'more competitive' 
will generally enhance welfare, particularly if non-price rivalry is intensified' 
(Schmalensee 1988, p. 677). 
The easy part is the effect on price, which follows directly from the definition 
of barriers to entry. In terms of Stigler (1968) entry barriers imply that poten- 
tial entrants face a cost disadvantage:  Ti< T e, where T denotes average total 
si>  0 
si=  0 
S~>0 
•  (Di-S'IDqS ~) 
(M-Si,O) 
S e =  0 
Entry  .~  (Di,  D e) 
v.  (M,O) 
Non  -entry 
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costs. The margin (G) between price (P) and average total costs, G -  pi_  T i, 
indicates  the height  of barriers to entry. The entry-deterring  (or,  limit) price 
pL is T e. For G = 0 there is no entry barrier. For G> 0 (i.e., if an entry barrier 
is present) the profit (~z) of an incumbent firm, 7r i= O i. G (where O is output), 
is  positive  (ignoring  time  and  discounting)  as  pL=Te>Ti.  Price  exceeds 
average total costs: pi> T i. Hence, the essential condition of static efficiency 
is violated. The very definition of entry barriers implies that in a static and par- 
tial context entry barriers induce static inefficiency as established firms can ap- 
propriate incumbency rent (Gilbert 1989,  p. 478). 
However, this is not to say that entry barriers necessarily introduce a welfare 
loss. The fact that barriers to entry can be closely related to dynamic efficiency 
introduces  a  complication.  The welfare implications depend  critically on the 
source of the entry barrier. In the literature the normative analysis of entry bar- 
riers is generally carried out with the help of a welfare function that consists of 
a  producers'  and  a  consumers'  surplus  (Tirole  1988,  pp.  11-12).  Profits are 
usually regarded  as  the producers'  surplus,  whereas  the  consumers'  surplus 
follows from a utility function.  Here it suffices to note that (i) the producers' 
surplus  increases  with  price  and  quantity  and  decreases  with  average (total) 
costs and (ii) the consumers' surplus generally increases with product quality, 
variety of products  and  quality of information and decreases with price and 
transaction costs. 
The producers' surplus follows from the profit of incumbents and entrants. 
On the one hand, from the incumbent firms' point of view entry barriers clear- 
ly, ceteris paribus,  raise welfare.  Zero-entry barriers are associated with free 
entry (pure-contestability) and so with a tendency to profit dissipation (subsec- 
tion 2.1), whereas barriers to entry are so defined that they yield a positive pro- 
fit.  The  higher  the  barrier  to  entry,  the  higher  the  profit  rate  which  the 
incumbent firms are facing. 2 On the other hand, entry barriers generally imply 
a reverse welfare effect on potential entrants, since barriers to entry restrict en- 
try (and profit) opportunities. 
From the consumers' perspective the source of the entry barriers is crucial. 3 
Take one typical example: advertising and  goodwill.  Advertising has a  good 
and a bad side. Nelson (1975) argues that 'there is much, indeed, in advertising 
that is informational:  price advertisements,  helpwanted  advertisements,  and 
pictures of dresses and furniture available in stores .... But surely ..., this is not 
the  whole  story.  What  about  the  frequent  endorsement  of a  brand  by an- 
nouncers,  actors,  or celebrities -  all of whom are paid for their efforts? It is 
advertisements of this  character that have produced  much of the skepticism 
about advertising's information role'  (Nelson  1975,  p.  213).  So,  advertising 
2  Conditional of course upon the assumption that potential competition dominates actual rivalry 
(Shepherd  1984). 
3  This is,  for  example,  immediately clear  from the extreme case where  the incumbent firms' 
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may introduce countervailing effects: if advertising  raises  an effective entry 
barrier, the limit price is increased, but transaction costs are lowered and infor- 
mation is increased. If advertising has a positive influence on price, the increas- 
ed  price may raise  the  incumbent  firms'  profits,  but  lowers the  consumers' 
surplus. The net effect of advertising on the consumers' surplus depends upon 
the quality of the information. So, the debate centers on the quality of the in- 
formation that is embodied in advertisements (Comanor and Wilson 1979, pp. 
472-473). Informative and noninformative advertisements have a different im- 
pact (Schmalensee 1978 and  1986). 
In effect, as is the case with entry barriers through informative advertising, 
the trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency is generally at stake (Von 
Weisz~icker  1980).  A  clear  example  is  reflected in the study of competition, 
R&D and innovation (Reinganum 1989). Entry barriers facilitate the profit rate 
of incumbent firms, but restrict the entry opportunities of potential entrants. 
The impact on consumers' utility critically depends on the source of the barrier 
to  entry.  So,  the literature  on pure-contestability (with  free entry)  and non- 
contestability  (with  impeded  entry)  illustrates  the  static-dynamic  efficiency 
dilemma. 
2.3  Quasi-contestability 
2.3.1  Literature 
Clark  (1940)  introduced  the  concept  of  workable  competition  in  order  to 
replace the unrealistic norm of perfect competition (Clark  1940,  pp. 241-242) 
by a benchmark that constitutes second-best performance: 'One central point 
may be put abstractly. If there are,  for example, five conditions, all of which 
are essential to perfect competition, and the first is lacking in a given case, then 
it no longer follows that we are necessarily better off for the presence of any 
one of the other four. In the absence of the first, it is apriori quite possible that 
the second and third may become positive detriments; and a workable satisfac- 
tory result  may depend  on achieving some degree of 'imperfection' in these 
other two factors ....  imperfect competition may be too strong as well as too 
weak; and ... workable competition needs to avoid both extremes' (Clark 1940, 
pp.  242-243).  Clark  presented  a  list  of the ten most  important  criteria that 
facilitate  workable  competition  (Clark  1940,  pp.  243-244).  Moreover,  he 
pointed to '[m]odified,  intermediate or hybrid competition ....  The most im- 
portant cases involve formally free entry, but no exit without loss' (Clark 1940, 
p. 245). 4 
In  1958  Sosnick  pointed  out  that  eighteen  authors  have listed  criteria  of 
4  It is interesting to note that Clark indicates that 'the more attention centers on the imperfec- 
tions of active  competition, the more important become  the forces of potential competition'  (Clark 
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workability that  can  be grouped  into  norms  for performance,  conduct  and 
structure. The selection of norms follows from an inquiry that 'would be con- 
cerned in the case of performance norms  to decide what state of the various 
performance dimensions would imply maximum service to buyers' desires, and 
in the case of structure and conduct norms, to decide what state of their dimen- 
sions would imply maximum effects on performance' (Sosnick 1958,  p. 395). 
The dynamics of competition are very important:  'Indeed, market incentives 
are able to designate and evoke aspects of desirable behavior not merely when 
enterprises are constrained by conditions like substitutes' availability and op- 
posites' knowledge, but when producers have freedom to innovate and latitude 
when successful' (Sosnick  1958,  p. 397). 
To  give  an  idea  of  the  nature  of  the  workability  criteria  listed  in  the 
literature, Table 2 presents Reid's (1987, p. 125) listing of Sosnick's norms. The 
fact of the matter is that the workability concept can be improved by providing 
a  formal microfoundation to the informal intuition.  This is useful,  since the 
'difficulty with this  approach  [workability]  lies  in  its  sheer  eclecticism.  The 
criteria developed seem frequently arbitrary and vague,  and occasionally in- 
consistent' (Reid 1987, p.  115).  The lack of analytical rigor goes hand in hand 
with  unanswered  questions:  what  is  the  relative  importance  of the  criteria 
listed;  in  what  ways may interdependencies  between  criteria  interfere;  what 
critical levels are associated with the criteria listed? Attempts to elaborate for- 
mally on the workable competition concept seem therefore to be justified. To 
focus attention, two essential criteria of workable competition, which capture 
many of Sosnick's (particularly performance) norms, have to be kept in mind. 
First  (norm I),  '[p]rofits should  be at levels just  sufficient to reward invest- 
ment,  efficiency and  innovation'  (Scherer  1980,  p.  42).  Second  (norm  II), 
'[o]pportunities  for introducing  technically  superior  new  products  and  pro- 
cesses should be exploited' (Scherer  1980,  p. 42). 
Broadly speaking,  formal models resembling workable competition can be 
grouped into two categories: patent race competition (Fudenberg et al.  1983; 
Fudenberg  and  Tirole  1985;  and  Mills  1988)  and  investment  contestability 
(Cairns  and  Mahabir  1988;  Calem  1988;  and  Van Witteloostuijn  1990b  and 
1990c).  The  common  denominator  in  this  literature  is  the  argument  that 
positive sunk  costs can be compatible with  a  free entry condition.  The  dif- 
ference is that patent race competition starts from the condition of free entry 
ex ante (that is, before costs have been sunk), whereas investment contestability 
is based upon an assumption of free entry expost (that is, after costs have been 
sunk). By way of illustration two exemplary models of patent race competition 
and  investment  contestability  are  briefly discussed:  Mills  (1988)  and  Calem 
(1988),  respectively. 
Patent race competition describes tournament games of a  winner-takes-all 
nature (Dasgupta 1986). By law, a patent effectively impedes potential entrants 
from entering the new technology or product: the winner of the patent is a pro- 
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TABLE 2 - STRUCTURE-CONDUCT-PERFORMANCE  NORMS 
Structure norms 
(1)  No dominance, and traders as large as economies of scale will permit 
(2)  Quality differentials which are moderate and sensitive to prices 
(3)  No impediments to mobility 
(4)  Reasonable availability of market information 
(5)  Some uncertainty about responses to price cutting 
(6)  Freedom from legal restraint 
(7)  Development of new markets and trade contracts 
Conduct norms 
(1)  Independent rivalry, in pursuit of profit 
(2)  No shielding of inefficient rivals, suppliers, or customers 
(3)  No unfair, exclusionary, predatory, or coercive tactics 
(4)  No unreasonable discrimination 
(5)  No misleading sales promotion 
(6)  Rapid response by buyers to differentials in attributes of products 
Performance norms 
(1)  Efficient production and distribution 
(2)  No excessive promotional expenses 
(3)  Profits sufficient to reward investment, efficiency, and innovation 
(4)  Output consistent with efficient resource allocation 
(5)  Prices that do not intensify cyclical problems 
(6)  Quality consistent with consumers' interest 
(7)  Appropriate exploitation of improved products and techniques 
(8)  Conservation requirements respected 
(9)  Sellers responsive to buyers' needs 
(10)  Entry as free as the industry sensibly permits 
(11)  Regard for national security requirements 
(12)  Avoidance of excessive political and economic power in few hands 
(13)  Regard for employees' welfare 
key point is that ex ante entry into the patent race may be free. Competition for 
a patent is a race to be the first: the timing of the introduction of the innovation 
is the rivals' strategic instrument. A  firm enters the patent race by sinking R&D 
outlays ex ante:  increasing R&D efforts speeds up the introduction of the in- 
novation.  R&D is subject to time diseconomies: earlier introduction dates re- 
quire  higher  R&D  budgets.  The  specifics of the  timing  game  determine the 
extent of rent dissipation (Fudenberg and Tirole 1987, p. 182). Mills (1988) pro- 
vides an example of a  timing game that gives zero profit to the winner. 
Mills describes two scenarios: one with costless threats and one with costly 
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that sunk costs can raise entry barriers. The essential assumptions of the setting 
wi~h costless threats are 'that there are two firms equally capable of making the 
investment and capturing the payoff. Assume that they have full information 
about each other and behave in a  noncooperative fashion. Assume that both 
firms would receive negative payoffs if both invest, because the second invest- 
ment would be redundant.  Unless both firms invest simultaneously, the pro- 
spect of certain loss is  enough to prevent a  second investment.  Neither  firm 
invests once it learns that its rival has invested ....  [It is] assume[d] that firms 
must act sequentially' (Mills  1988,  p.  116).  So, entry is free ex ante. 
Sequential investment implies a positive entry and adjustment lag, where en- 
try always can occur before the incumbent is able to adjust. Three assumptions 
complete the model. First,  t  m is the monopoly's unique optimal introduction 
date of the sunk investment: that is,  a protected monopoly would invest a sunk 
cost  at  date  t,,,  since  then  the  maximum  payoff can  be  captured.  Second, 
~t- 1  < gt for t_< tin: this is an assumption of time diseconomies. Third,  a zero 
profit accrues to the firm which refrains from investment (or entry): the oppor- 
tunity cost of entry is zero. The result of the timing game is that '[t]he invest- 
ment described above can be viewed as  a  natural monopoly where potential 
monopoly rents  are  dissipated  by  rivalrous  behavior.  While  this  outcome 
results  from the potential for "hit-and-run-entry" in contestable markets, in 
this  model it  results  from pre-emptive timing.  In a  contestable market  rent 
dissipation occurs because entry involves no unrecoverable costs.  Here it oc- 
curs because entry can be timed strategically' (Mills  1988,  p.  117). 
Investment contestability starts from the critique that perfect 'contestability 
theory leaves  unanswered  questions  about  the  identity  of entrants  and  the 
source of their resources .... Rather than as a hindrance to potential entry, sunk 
costs are viewed as being of key significance for the disciplining of oligopolists 
through potential entry' (Cairns  and Mahabir  1988,  p. 269). This means that 
'[e]stablished firm entry is easier than new firm entry, an important factor be- 
ing reserve or excess capacity in the short run which may be shifted to produc- 
ing  other  types  of  product ....  Altering  the  product  set  requires  latent 
fungibility as well as latent capacity. The latter may be provided by previously 
sunk  expenditures  for  capital:  the  former  requires  discovering  the  latent 
fungibility, through R & D and other expenditures that are necessarily sunk, as 
well as the use of the goodwill of the firm' (Cairns and Mahabir 1988, p. 273). 
Investment contestability describes potential competition from existing poten- 
tial  entrants  which can benefit  from sunk investments  in their home market 
(Van Witteloostuijn 1990b and 1990c): entry is free expost. Calem (1988) pro- 
vides an example of investment contestability. 
Calem (1988) offers a model of penetrable markets:  'The potential entrant 
may be a firm producing an identical product but operating in a geographically 
distinct market, in which case ease of entry would derive from low transport 
costs; or it may be a firm producing a distinct but technologically related pro- 
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tion. A  market faced with entry as such may be deemed a penetrable market. 
It is plausible that a firm in a penetrable market would be unable to adjust its 
total output as rapidly as a potential entrant could transfer some of its products 
into the market .... the rivalry between a firm in a penetrable market and a firm 
threatening to enter that market may be reciprocal. As these firms operate in 
related  markets,  each  may be  a  potential  entrant  into  the  other's  market' 
(Calem  1988,  p.  171).  In line with Shepherd  (1984) and Green (1987),  Calem 
(1988,  pp.  172-173  and  180)  argues that the penetrable market model applies 
particularly to (the threat of) foreign competition, 
Calem's model describes Cournot rather than Bertrand competition: quanti- 
ty is the strategic variable. It is essential that incumbent firms and potential en- 
trants  decide  on  output  (productive  capacity) simultaneously.  That  is,  '[a] 
novel feature of our model is that the monopolist in a  market,  and the firm 
threatening  entry into the market,  both make strategic choices (choose their 
total outputs)  during the pre-entry stage' (Calem  1988,  p.  172).  Entry is an- 
ticipated  by  installing  excess  capacity.  Further  assumptions  are  that  two 
monopolists  in  two  distinct  markets  face  a  joint  production  technology, 
whereas the entry lag and transfer (entry) costs are positive. Moreover, a firm 
is committed to productive capacity for one period (with a pre-entry and post- 
entry stage). 
The result of the model is that '[i]n a penetrable market, as in a contestable 
market,  a  threat of entry can limit the exercise of monopoly power' (Calem 
1988, p.  173).  This result depends critically upon the features of the setting in- 
volved. To be precise,  '[a] firm facing a threat of entry will employ an entry- 
deterring strategy in its home market only if its transfer costs are large enough 
to rule out its being a potential entrant into its rival's market. Moreover, in the 
asymmetric case, the firm facing a threat of entry into its market will expand 
its output to an entry-deterring level only if its rival's transfer costs are in a 
medium range (not if those costs are small)' (Calem 1988, p.  181).  This means 
that market performance resembles workable competition if the entry threat is 
one-sided.  The  entrant's  home  market  is  safe  against  entry by expelled  in~ 
cumbents. 
2.3.2  Game 
The three  groups  of theories  that  combine the  merits  of pure-contestability 
(average  cost  pricing)  and  non-contestability  (sunk  investment)  -  workable 
competition, patent race rivalry and investment contestability - can be denoted 
as  quasi-contestability.  The  key feature  of quasi-contestability  is  that  sunk 
costs are positive and entry is free (ex ante or expost) such that profit is driven 
down  to  zero.  The  quasi-contestability  game  has  two  stages:  the  first-stage 
subgame  determines  (the  height  and/or  timing  of)  sunk  investment;  the 
second-stage subgame focuses on competition for market share. Games with ex 
ante free entry (patent race rivalry) are different from games with expost free 
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stage subgame: the winner of the patent can benefit from a protected monopoly 
position. Market performance follows from the outcome of the first-stage tim- 
ing subgame: rent dissipation may occur if entry is free ex ante, which induces 
zero-profit pre-emptive timing under specific conditions (for example, sequen- 
tial investment, time diseconomies and zero opportunity cost of entry). 
Investment contestability is associated with second-stage free entry if incum- 
bent firms and potential entrants face (cost and product) parity after the first- 
stage subgame on sunk investment. The key difference with non-contestability 
games  (Figure  1)  is  that the first-stage subgame is  dictated by simultaneous 
strategy formulation: incumbent firms and potential entrants decide on sunk 
investment without being informed of the decision of the rivals. The nature of 
an illustrative two-staged game for a duopoly is depicted in Figure 2,  where 
payoffs indicate  the  gross  profits  (that  is,  without  taking  into  account the 
amortization of sunk costs) captured in the incumbent firm's market.  Firms 
decide on  sunk  investment  ex  ante.  For  the  sake  of convenience, take  the 
discrete case where firms face two investment opportunities: S= 0 or S= S*. 
Four second-stage subgame equilibrium outcomes can be identified: 
(A)  Both  rivals  face  parity:  the  second-stage  subgame  resembles  pure- 
contestability (Table 1) for average total cost pricing, which takes the amortiza- 
tion of sunk costs into account. 
(B)  The incumbent firm has developed a  first-mover advantage:  the second- 
stage subgame resembles non-contestability (Figure 1) with outcome (M, 0). 
(C)  The incumbent firm is outpaced by the entrant: second-stage entry (Figure 
1) gives outcome (Di, D e), where D i = 0 and D e = M if the entrant is able to ful- 
ly replace the incumbent. 
(D)  Neither firm has sunk any cost: the second-stage subgame reflects pure- 
contestability (Table 1). 
Quasi-contestability  describes  cases  of  competition  where  the  perfect 
S i  =  S* 
S i=  0 
< 
S e  ~  S* 
•  (S~,S *)  (A) 
~.  (M,0)  (B) 
Se=  0 
•  (0,0) 
.... ,"  Se=0 
S e  ~  S* 
~.  (Di,  D e)  (C) 
Figure 2  -  Quasi-contestabiJity 
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equilibrium  of the two-staged game is si= Se= S*,  average total cost pricing 
(zero profit) and non-entry (equilibrium (A)). For example, in Calem (1988) S* 
is the cost sunk in productive capacity in the first stage: the fact that both firms 
sink costs in the first stage may limit monopoly power in the second stage. The 
quest  for competitive conditions that give free entry and zero profit ex post, 
notwithstanding positive sunk investment ex ante, is the subject matter of sec- 
tions  3 and 4:  that is, the focus is on investment contestability. The logic of 
backward induction  (Rasmusen 1989, p. 88) dictates that section 3 focuses on 
the second-stage subgame for market share (what conditions  explain why the 
second-stage payoff matrix resembles pure-contestability?), whereas section 4 
deals with the first-stage subgame on sunk investment (why are firms inclined 
to  undertake  first-stage  sunk  investment  in  the  prospect  of  zero  profit?). 
However, first the scene will be set in subsection 2.3.3. 
2.3.3  Performance 
Quasi-contestability  combines  the  merits  of  pure  and  non-contestability. 
Average total cost pricing goes hand in hand with positive sunk investment. 
Table 3 summarizes Scherer's (1980, p. 42) performance features of the three 
categories of competition. Criterion I implies that P = T ( -  Vif S = 0), whereas 
norm II is associated with S > 0. 
Of course, criterion II is weak: the condition that S> 0 is insufficient to in- 
duce dynamic efficiency. The quality of dynamic performance stands or falls 
with the specifics of the sunk investment S: this is the well-known dilemma of 
evaluating the welfare features of entry barriers (subsection 2.2.3). Section 4 il- 
lustrates dynamic efficiency of quasi-contestability for the cases of process and 
product innovation. 
A review of the literature indicates that the credibility of the threat of poten- 
tial entry is the key issue. The answers to three questions are particularly rele- 
vant in determining the credibility of the entry threat and hence the nature of 
competition. 
(1)  Are  incumbent  firms  and  potential  entrants  at  par  in  terms  of  sunk 
technology and product features ((a)symmetry of sunk cost)? 
(2) Are potential entrants able to attract the incumbent firms' customers before 
the latter are able to respond (structure of time lags)? 
(3) Is the cost or profit foregone with entry zero (scale of opportunity cost of 
entry)? 
TABLE 3 -  COMPARISON OF PERFORMANCES 
Theory of competition  Static performance  Dynamic performance 
Pure-contestability  P =  T= V  S = 0 
Quasi-contestability  P-  T> V  S> 0 
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Quasi-contestability prevails if the answer to questions  (1),  (2) and (3) is yes. 
This is, for example, the case for the models of Calem (1988) and Mills (1988). 
However,  this  begs  the  question:  what  competitive  environments  facilitate 
quasi-contestability?  By way of illustration,  sections 3 and 4 describe a quest 
for favorable market conditions that impose a discipline on incumbent firms' 
conduct. Then, quasi-contestability goes with a credible threat of potential en- 
try that forces incumbent firms to behave in the interest of customers.  It ap- 
pears that the sources of potential entry are of crucial importance. 
3  STATIC EFFICIENCY: PRICING POLICIES AND SOURCES OF POTENTIAL ENTRY 
3. l  Established Potential Entrants 
Outcomes resembling quasi-contestability stand or fall with the (in)credibility 
of the entry threat. Perfect contestability theory apriori assumes a credible en- 
try threat. That is, the entry threat is exogenous to the theory. This is also true 
for the  literature  on entry barriers  and  patent  races.  Broadly speaking,  the 
assumption of an exogenous entry threat is common in IO: the models remain 
silent on the identity of potential entrants.  For the sake of convenience, this 
section takes perfect contestability as its point of departure. Among the many 
critiques of the contestable market theory, one line stands out that is relevant 
in the current context. Shepherd (1984), Calem (1988) and Cairns and Mahabir 
(1988) argue that the existence and credibility of the entry threat in a perfectly 
contestable market needs careful examination. What is the identity of these en- 
trants  that  are  able to  hit-and-run  to  benefit  from short-lived  entry  oppor- 
tunities  only?  If potential  entrants  are new  firms that still  need to build  up 
capacity, their  speed of response is  unlikely to  be as  fast as  hit-and-run  re- 
quests. Besides, entry by new firms is unlikely to be associated with a zero sunk 
entry cost. 5 So, they probably are existing firms which contest,  for example, 
not by investing in the entry market, but rather by exporting goods (Shepherd 
1984, p. 584; and Green 1987, p. 485). Established firms are engaged in poten- 
tial entry into each other's market (Calem 1988). For example, import competi- 
tion does indeed constitute a major threat against market shares of dominant 
firms (Scherer  1980,  p. 241). 
Following  Cairns  and  Mahabir  (1988)  and  Calem  (1988)  home  market 
arguments can be used to identify credible potential entrants. The key point is 
that the foundation of the credibility of the entry threat is facilitated by focus- 
ing on a multimarket framework (Van Witteloostuijn and Van Wegberg 1992). 
A multimarket approach is implicit in many accounts of the contestable market 
(for example, Baumol et al.  1982, p. xxi). Making it explicit, however, breaks 
5  Perfect contestability gets around this dilemma by assuming that capital is not sunk. That is, 
capital can be bought and sold in an outside capital market in such a way that the selling firms only 
~ose a  user cost. However, this only begs the question: what rationale underlies the existence of 
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with one dominant  assumption in the literature on entry and exit in  IO: the 
exogeneity of the opportunity cost of entry. The common assumption is that 
the opportunity cost of entry is zero: potential entrants earn a zero profit if they 
do not enter. Hence, they enter only if entry profits are strictly positive. This 
can be the case because the alternative to entry is either zero production and 
investment  or  stable  home  market  profit.  Home  market  profit  does  not 
influence the entry decision  because of the usual  key assumption that entry 
leaves  the  entrant's  home  market  profit  unchanged.  However,  in  a 
multimarket context the assumption of zero opportunity cost of entry is not so 
obvious. 
On  the  one  hand,  serving the  entry market with  overcapacity has  a  zero 
opportunity  cost.  However,  overcapacity  invites  dumping,  which  is  not 
consistent  with  quasi-contestability,  since  dumping  strategies  are  associated 
with prices below average total cost. On the other hand, without overcapacity 
the  opportunity  cost  of  entry  may  exceed  zero.  Potential  entrants  facing 
binding capacity restrictions incur a profit foregone in the home market if entry 
is undertaken.  So, two questions focus on the credibility of the entry threat in 
a multimarket framework: (1) can dumping strategies be avoided if firms face 
excess  productive  capacities?  (subsection  3.2);  and  (2)  can  a  credible  entry 
threat exist if potential entrants have to take into account the implications of 
binding  productive  capacity restrictions?  (subsection  3.3)  This section starts 
from the assumption that incumbent firms and potential entrants face parity: 
that  is,  both  parties  have  invested  Si= Se=S  in  the  first  stage,  which  has 
induced cost and product parity in the second stage. This means that the focus 
is on the second-stage Bertrand subgame of a two-staged potential rivalry game 
(Figure 2). The outcome of the first-stage subgame on investment is taken for 
granted.  Section 4 deals with the first-stage subgame. 
3.20vercapacity 
Cairns and Mahabir (1988) suggest that the credibility of the entry threat ensues 
from firms with excess capacity in related markets. They 'argue that firms in 
related  industries  have  an  advantage  because  of their  own  sunk  costs.  An 
advantage (over completely new  firms or  firms in unrelated  industries)  may 
arise if costs  are sunk  and  (1)  there  is short-run  excess capacity because of 
unpredictable  demand  fluctuations;  (2)  there  are regular  peak and off-peak 
periods and the firm is actively seeking a use for its off-peak excess capacity; 
(3) it is normal to have some capacity reserve that can be utilized if need be, 
perhaps at higher operating costs; (4) the firm has excess capacity, created in 
order  to  deter  entry to  its  own market...;  or  (5)  the  firm is  a  member of a 
monopolistically  competitive  industry  and,  for  that  reason,  has  excess 
capacity' (Cairns  and Mahabir  1988,  p. 273). 
However,  the  entry  threat  from  potential  entrants  with  overcapacity  is 
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profitable  strategy. 6 If a  firm has  excess  capacity,  then  this  firm is,  ceteris 
paribus,  inclined to use this excess capacity so as to supply commodities in the 
rivals' market for any price above marginal entry cost: this is dumping.  Actual 
entry is likely to diminish the incumbent firm's profit -  if it does not drive the 
incumbent firm off the market altogether. The incumbent firm may retaliate by 
reciprocal entry into the entrant's home market (Bulow et al.  1985;  and Calem 
1988).  Bulow et al.  (1985)  point to strategic interactions  that can occur in a 
multimarket framework. In an example of two monopolists A and B, which are 
potential  entrants  into  each other's markets,  they argue that  'B's  entry will 
change  A's  equilibrium  output  in  the  market  where  it  is  incumbent  and 
therefore possibly alter its  decision  of whether  to  enter B's market ....  if B 
enters A's market then it may be profitable for A to retaliate. So the threat that 
deters B's expansion is a credible one' (Bulow et al.  1985,  p.  505). 
The point is that exit gives idle productive capacity. The expelled incumbent 
firm can increase profits (or decrease losses) by selling output in the entrant's 
market for any price above average marginal entry cost. As exit is associated 
with  zero  production,  an  expelled  firm  can  profitably  enter  the  entrant's 
market for any price above average variable cost. The threat of dumping by ex- 
pelled  incumbent  firms  does  not  undermine  the  credibility  of the  potential 
rivals' entry threat either if the potential entrants' home market is safe against 
entry by expelled incumbent firms or if the incumbents' response lag is large 
enough to invalidate the retaliatory dumping threat (subsection 3.3). The case 
may be different, however, particularly if both incumbent firms and potential 
entrants have sustainable overcapacity. For illustrative purposes, an argument 
can be put forward so as to defend the assumption that dumping does not oc- 
cur. Particularly the literature on international economics has been concerned 
with  the  issue  of (reciprocal)  dumping  (Brander  and  Krugman  1983;  Pinto 
1986;  Calem 1988;  and Venables  1990). 
Assume that  potential  entrants  take into  account the  threat  of reciprocal 
dumping.  That  is,  incumbent  firms have the  opportunity to  dump into  the 
potential entrants' home market. Therefore, incumbent firms and potential en- 
trants play a game on excess capacity (dumping) and price, which may or may 
not yield an equilibrium that is associated with statically efficient outcomes and 
the  absence  of  (anticipative)  dumping.  Take  two  symmetric  representative 
firms i (incumbent  firm) and e (potential entrant),  respectively. Assume that 
both firms play a (Bertrand-) Nash game on dumping in both markets. Ignor- 
ing lag conditions, the payoff matrix is indicated in Table 4. 
The  static  (one-period)  dumping  game  clearly  reflects  a  noncooperative 
Prisoners' Dilemma, since  Y< Z< (0<)X, which yields a Nash equilibrium in 
which both firms decide to dump (Z, Z),  although the solution where neither 
firm dumps (0, 0) is preferable. The dynamic (multiperiod) repeated dumping 
6  A second comment is that excess capacities are not always sustainable in a market with free en- 
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Incumbent firm 
TABLE 4 -  RECIPROCAL DUMPING 
Po  ten  tial en tran t 
Zero dumping  Positive dumping 
Zero dumping  (0, 0)  (Y, X) 
Positive dumping  (X, Y)  (Z, Z) 
game is more complicated (Friedman 1986). At least three (related) arguments 
can be used to indicate that the strategy pair that neither firm decides to dump, 
is a (Nash) equilibrium. 
First,  reputation  considerations  can  call  into  question  the  equilibrium 
features of the case where both firms are dumping. Firm i can communicate to 
firm e that  firm i's dumping will be followed by reciprocal dumping,  which 
leaves  firm  e  worse  off]  This  argument  bears  a  family resemblance  to  the 
predation literature (Milgrom and Roberts  1982;  and Roberts  1986).  Second, 
the reputation effect wins cogency if firms have or behave as if they have an in- 
finite planning horizon.  In effect, the Folk Theorem  8 shows that the preferred 
payoff  combination  can  be  a  subgame  Nash  equilibrium  in  an  infinitely 
repeated Prisoners'  Dilemma (Pinto  1986).  The assumption of planning as if 
the horizon is infinite is plausible,  since firms are generally uncertain  of the 
date at which they will cease to operate. Fisher (1989) points out that 'real-life 
incumbents do not face a well-defined finite set of potential entrants. Corpora- 
tions in most contexts are assumed to have an infinite horizon and surely can- 
not  believe that  any particular  fight  will  be the  last'  (Fisher  1989,  p.  123). 
Third, firms can (tacitly) agree upon not dumping. The dumping game is non- 
cooperative but gives (tacitly) cooperative outcomes. The case where neither 
firm dumps is clearly the cooperative outcome. 
3.3  Binding Capacity 
Binding productive capacity constraints can introduce  a positive opportunity 
cost of entry. Binding capacity restrictions force the firm to give up sales in its 
home market in order to be able to serve an entry market. Cairns and Mahabir 
(1988) point out that '[t]he entrant shifts capacity from an original [market] .... 
expecting to return after a hit-and-run entry. But that shift reduces capacity in 
the original market, as compared with the original equilibrium there, forcing a 
disequilibrium in which prices must rise to clear the market, thereby creating 
profits for remaining firms. That market will then be invaded by yet another 
7  Moreover, firm e has to take into account the observation that, if firm e repeatedly decides to 
dump, it is likely that firm i will start to expect that firm e will dump. This induces firm i's best an- 
ttcipative reply to dump as well,  which leaves firm e worse off. 
8  The Folk Theorem 'clarifies the role of trigger strategies in supporting cooperative outcomes 
by means of noncooperative equilibrium strategy combinations' (Friedman 1986, p. 104). For ex- 
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entrant. But that leaves no room for the first invader to return to the original 
market' (Cairns and Mahabir  1988,  p. 271). 
This  subsection  describes  six  scenarios  where  existing  firms  operating 
elsewhere imply a credible entry threat, because they (i) have fungible capital or 
(ii) face a negligible transportation cost disadvantage. That is, there are poten- 
tial entrants which can easily switch productive capacity or transfer (part of) 
the commodities produced to the incumbents' market. Suppose that demand is 
localized so that only firms are mobile between markets (which is, for instance, 
plausible in the context of international competition) and assume the absence 
of anticipative (reciprocal) dumping (subsection 3.2).  To illustrate the role of 
time  lags,  a  number  of ex post  periods  is  assumed  (i.e.,  the  second-stage 
subgame in Figure 2 is stretched over a number of periods).  Incumbent firms 
announce prices  and  potential  entrants  decide  on entry at  the beginning of 
period t = 1 on the basis of the result of R&D in period t- 0. R&D requires sunk 
cost So.  Prices remain fixed during a period  9 (incumbent firms' price adjust- 
ment delayA = 1). The response of incumbent firms in the case of exit takes one 
period  (incumbent  firms  response  lag  upon entry R = 1).  Discounting is  ig- 
nored. The average total cost price is P * = T. The life time of the innovation ex- 
pires  after  period  t=F:  before  t=F+l  the  invested  sunk  costs  must  be 
recovered.  Moreover,  the  prototype  market  argument  is  based  upon  the 
assumption that  firms  face (investment  and  production) cost parity (S~= Sg 
and  ~i= VF):  the  answer to  question  (1)  in  subsection 2.3.3  is  affirmative. 
Potential entrants enter the market if they perceive any profit opportunity. The 
potential entrants' entry lag is assumed to be zero (E= 0). The combination of 
E= 0, A = 1 and R > 0 provides question (2) in subsection 2.3.3 with an affir- 
mative  answer.  The  outcome  of the  investment  S  o can  be  applied  to  both 
markets. However, with binding capacity restrictions a firm is not able to serve 
both markets simultaneously. 
Home market arguments can be facilitated by a restriction to one-sided entry 
(threats). That is, the potential entrants' home market is safe against entry. This 
means that entrants can anticipate an easy return to the home market after hit- 
and-run entry.  For example,  Calem (1988)  introduces the assumption of one- 
sided entry (threats) by arguing that the incumbent firms' entry cost is sufficiently 
high to keep it from entering the potential entrants' market or, alternatively, by 
supposing that there are legal or regulatory barriers which prevent incumbent 
firms from being potential entrants into the rivals' market. One-sided entry fixes 
a zero opportunity cost of entry (a definite yes to question (3) in subsection 2.3.3). 
It is important to distinguish the case where F= 1 from the one where F> 1. 
For F= 1, unlike F> 1, the assumption of (potential) entrants' Bertrand con- 
jectures is easily sustained. 
9  This  assumption is in accordance  with Hicks' (1939, p. 122). The identification of a period with 
the interval in time during which prices are constant is nowadays adopted in the popular 'tem- 
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EXAMPLE 1 (short-lived innovations). For F= 1 it is obvious that a potential 
entrant  is  able to  adopt hit-and-run  entry.  Sunk  cost must be recovered in 
period t =  1.  If an incumbent  firm is expelled from the market as a result of 
careless price setting in period t =  1 (PI>PI*), then the incumbent firm fails to 
recover the invested sunk costs, because the incumbent can only re-enter after 
one period (R -- 1 so that re-entry cannot take place before period t = 2 when the 
innovation is outdated): 
7r i= -So.  (1) 
Hence, the expelled incumbent firm faces an exit cost. The entrant can capture 
positive hit-and-run profits so that no exit costs are incurred: 
~ze =  [(P~- Va)" Q~I -S0>0,  (2) 
where Q is the quantity sold. Condition (2) gives entry if the potential entrant 
captures a zero profit in the home market. F= 1 corresponds,  for instance, to 
the  case where  firms introduce  incremental,  short-lived  innovations  so that 
R&D expenditures must be amortized in a short (one) period of time. The in- 
cumbent firm is only able to retaliate through re-entry after the expiration date 
of the innovation (F=R = 1)  when the entrant can safely return to its home 
market. 
For F> 1 it is likely that potential entrants anticipate the response of an expelled 
incumbent firm at the beginning of period t = 2. Hence, they only temporarily 
employ Bertrand conjectures.  So, assume that potential entrants only employ 
Bertrand conjectures for the first period after entry. They correctly anticipate 
the response of an expelled firm at the beginning of t = 2 (or R +  1 in Example 
4). The likely response of an expelled incumbent firm follows from the argu- 
ment that an incumbent is inclined  to re-enter after exit at the beginning of 
period t = 2 for any price in excess of its average variable cost (that is, in excess 
of the shut-down-price).  A  price P/> Vt (where t> 1) enables the recovery of 
(part of) the sunk cost invested. It is the sunk nature of investment expenditures 
that induces  the incentive to an expelled incumbent  firm to re-enter for any 
P/> V~, because the opportunity cost of refraining from entry (zr~) exceeds the 
cost of re-entry (rr~,): 
z~= -So< rr~= [ t=~z(P/- V~)" Q/] - So <0,  (3) 
for any P/> Vt.  There are now a  number of examples of cases where incum- 
bent firms face a credible threat of entry, despite their ability to respond with 
low-priced re-entry at the beginning of period t == 2. One example fits into the 
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EXAMPLE  2  (temporary cross-entry). Potential  entrants  deploy temporary 
cross-entry. Before the incumbent firm is able to respond, the entrant returns 
to its home market (H). Suppose that the entrant is able to sell a quantity QH 
at price P~ in the period from t = 2 to t =F after returning to its home market 
at the beginning  of period  t=2.  If an incumbent  firm sets P/>Pt*, then the 
potential entrant enters even for F> 1 if entry gives a positive profit 
I r  l  7"ge =- [(P~- Vl)" Qf] -}-  2  (P~-  Vt)" Q~  -So > 0, 
t=2 
(4) 
for any P~>Pa* (provided that PH=P1*). Hence,  if condition  (4)  holds,  the 
entrant does not face any exit cost. Re-entry of the expelled firm at the begin- 
ning of period t = 2 is associated with P/= P* (where t = 2 .... , F) so as to avoid 
further exit. So, the incumbent firm, again,  faces exit costs: 
E r  ]  ~i=  ~  (P,*- Vt)- Q{  -S0<0.  (5) 
t=2 
Condition (5) corresponds to the case where (internal) conditions in the poten- 
tial entrant's home market dictate price PH = P~ in the period t = 1, so that the 
opportunity cost of refraining from entry for any P~>PI* is positive, condi- 
tional upon the assumption that the potential entrant is  able to return to its 
home market at the beginning of period t = 2 without suffering negative conse- 
quences  (in  the  sense  of  losing  the  home  market).  So,  P~=P1* gives  the 
threshold entry-deterring price level P/= P~* where the potential entrant is in- 
different between entry and non-entry. 
Further examples follow from dropping the assumption of an easy return to a 
home market.  Then,  although  an entrant is  able to  'hit' at the beginning of 
period t =  1, it is unable to 'run' at the beginning of period t = 2. It may be that 
a return to the home market is impossible altogether or that a profitable return 
is only feasible after the sunk costs have been fully recovered at period t=F. 
Examples 1 and 2 assume that the incumbent firm faces idle productive capaci- 
ty during the period of exit. This need not be the case. For example, it can be 
that the expelled incumbent  firm enters another (perhaps even the entrant's) 
market. By shipping goods to an entry market, entrants without excess capacity 
withdraw supply from their home market. This may invite further entry into 
the entrant's market. Hence, when the entrant returns from its hit-and-run, it 
is likely to discover that it has lost its home market (Cairns and Mahabir 1988). 
The next examples assimilate this argument by focusing on hit-and-stay entry. 
Note  that  one  complication  is  ignored:  collusion.  Firms  meeting  in  many 
markets may have incentives to collude (Van Witteloostuijn and Van Wegberg 
1992).  Broadly speaking,  second-stage collusion  tends  to damage static effi- 
ciency (Jacquemin and Slade  1989).  The examples below ignore collusion by I30  A. VAN W1TTELOOSTUIJN 
assuming that (i) collusion is prohibited by law or (ii) incentives to compete are 
dominant (that is, the payoff of cheating exceeds the profit of colluding). 
EXAMPLE 3 (small R&D budgets).  For F> 1 the potential entrant responds 
with entry to a P{ > P~ (provided that home market price P1H = PI*, which im- 
plies a zero opportunity cost of entry) if it is profitable to deter re-entry by the 
expelled incumbent firm by reducing P~ to the expelled incumbent firm's op- 
portunity price at the beginning of period t= 2. Take,  for example, the case 
where the incumbent firm receives a price V2 outside its home market. Then, if 
[(Pf- Vl)- Q~] -  So > 0,  (6) 
then the potential entrant is able to capture positive profits without inducing re- 
entry. Condition (6) implies that a potential entrant is inclined to enter if the en- 
try price permits the recovery of the sunk cost in one period. If condition (6) 
holds, the entrant faces no exit costs. Then, successful entry by the expelled 
firm requires P~< V  2, which is not worthwhile, since condition (3) is violated. 
The expelled incumbent firm faces exit costs  (equation (1)).  Obviously, this 
case is extremely sensitive to the precise value of S o (i.e., the scale of invest- 
ment). Low values of S  o (that is, small R&D budgets) facilitate the likelihood 
that this case is valid.  However, in general condition (6) is unlikely to hold. 
Consider, therefore, three further scenarios. 
EXAMPLE 4 (large response lag). Suppose that the argument by Baumol et al. 
(1982) that  'incumbents  are restrained by law  and  other impediments  from 
undertaking retaliatory moves' (Baumol et al.  1982,  p.  350),  i.e.,  post-entry 
price reductions or low-priced re-entry, holds in such a way that expelled in- 
cumbent  firms  suffer  from  a  response  lag  1 <R<F.  Then,  condition  (6) 
transforms into 
{  1 
[(P~-Va) Q~I+  ~  (Pp- Vt). Q[  -S0>0,  (7) 
t=2 
since, for t = 2, ..., R, the entrant only fears hit-and-run entry by other poten- 
tial entrants,  so that P7  Pf*> V  t deters entry for t = 2, ..., R. Again,  the ex- 
pelled firm, unlike the entrant, faces exit costs (equation (1)). 
From condition (7) it follows that high values of R  (that is, large response 
lags of expelled incumbent firms) make it more likely that this case is valid. In 
effect, this  scenario  shows  close resemblance  to  Example  2  (for Pff=PF), 
although the entrant is unable to return to its home market as,  for example, 
other entrants have invaded its home market (before period t = F). Moreover, 
for R ~  F this case converges to Example 1. 
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Suppose that an expelled firm is able to benefit from an alternative use of its 
R&D  output.  Then,  of  course,  the  R&D  expenditures  (I0)  are  not  fully 
unrecoupable.  If sunk exit cost is denoted  by S 0,  then S O  <I0;  so far,  it has 
been tacitly assumed that S o = I o.  Suppose that 
(8) 
where  7rF  U denotes  the  (negative)  profits  from alternative  use,  composed of 
profits during period t = 1 (7rl  U) and t = 2 (rr~). Then, for t = 2 there is a P~ >  V  2 
such that re-entry is deterred.  This entry-deterring price (PzL), and associated 
quantity (Q~), follows from 
L  L  U 
(P2  -  g2)" Q2  =  7~2.  (9) 
Hence, the potential entrant  now decides to enter if the  following condition 
holds: 
[(P~ -  V1). Q~] + 7~2  U- I 0 > O.  (lO) 
If condition (10) holds, the entrant does not face an exit barrier. The expelled 
firm is  only  able  to  enter  successfully  by offering  a  P~<P2  L,  which  is  not 
worthwhile,  since then 
(P~- V2)- Q£< 7r  U.  (11) 
The incumbent's exit costs follow from assumption (8): 
=  u  I0<0.  7r i  -S  /  =  7[  F  --  (12) 
So, the likelihood of a credible fear of hit-and-stay entry is facilitated by high 
benefits from the alternative use of R&D output. 
EXAMPLE 6 (reciprocal entry).  Suppose that an expelled incumbent firm can 
take the place of the entrant in the latter's home market, s0 If competitive con- 
ditions  in  the  potential  entrants'  home  market  dictate  price  P~=P*  for 
t-1,  ...,F,  the  entrant  can  deter  re-entry  by the  expelled  incumbent  after 
period t=2  (R = 1) by setting the average total cost price from period t=2 to 
period t=F. Hence, entry is profitable if 
I  1 
[(P~-Vj)-Qf]+  ~  (Pt*-Vt) • Q7  -S0>0,  (13) 
t=2 
l0  Alternatively,  it  can be assumed that the expelled incumbent firm is able to  enter a  third 
market. Porter (1980,  pp. 84-85) calls competition over a  third market 'cross-parry.' 132  A. VAN WITTELOOSTUIJN 
which holds for any PI  h' = P~* < Pf < P[. Hence, if expelled incumbent firms are 
able to undertake  reciprocal entry into  the potential  entrants'  home market 
against P~, only P(= P~* deters entry when P~ = Pt* (for t = 2 ..... F). The ex- 
pelled incumbent firm faces a zero exit cost as capital can be used profitably in 
another market. This example points out that incumbent firms' low exit cost 
(as a result of the opportunities of reciprocal entry) increases the credibility of 
the hit-and-stay entry strategy of potential entrants, 11 
4  DYNAMIC  EFFICIENCY:  ENTRY-DETERRING  STRATEGIES  AND  SUNK 
INNOVATION 
Examples 1 to 6 predict static efficiency even for cases with positive sunk costs. 
However,  the  question  of dynamic  efficiency is  bypassed by assuming that 
S~ = S~ and ignoring the nature  of the investment.  This section complements 
section 3 by focusing  on the investment issue.  Section 3  described  scenarios 
with static efficiency: this is the outcome of the second-stage subgame of a two- 
staged game (Figure 2). The first stage focuses on investment; the second stage 
deals with price (potential) competition. The outcome for investment strategy 
can be illustrated with an easy-to-understand first-stage subgame. This section 
takes the second-stage outcomes as given while concentrating on the firms' in- 
vestment strategies in the first stage. For the sake of convenience, time indices 
are suppressed. 
Suppose that incumbent firms face prototype potential entrants which will 
capture  a  zero  profit  if they  refrain  from  entry (PH=p*=T).  Incumbent 
firms and prototype potential entrants have access to identical production (V) 
and investment (S) technologies.  An evaluation of dynamic performance re- 
quires that the nature of the sunk investment is taken into account (subsection 
2.2.3). By way of illustration the focus of investment is assumed to be innova- 
tion. 12 That is, investment S gives a process or product innovation. S* (in com- 
bination  with  P*)  maximizes  buyers'  utility  either  through  cost  and  price 
reduction (process innovation: Van Witteloostuijn 1990b) or product improve- 
ment (product innovation: Van Witteloostuijn 1990c). Hence, the choice of S* 
gives an innovation that is in the interest of the buyers through decreased price 
(process innovation) or increased quality (product innovation). Firms face two 
11  The argument in Examples 5 and 6 resembles Eaton and Lipsey's (1980) proposition that '[t]o 
make an entry-deterring threat ... the sitting monopolist must threaten that in the event of entry, 
he will stay in the market 'long enough that the entrant's present value at the time of entry will be 
nonpositive. 'Long enough' is A* periods .... A* can be interpreted as the monopolist's minimum 
commitment to the market or as the mimmum barrier to his exit.  It is in this sense that barriers to 
exit are barriers m entry' (Eaton and Lipsey 1980, p. 728).  Examples 5 and 6 mirror this result by 
pointing out that the credibility of the incumbent's re-entry threat decreases if the incumbent's exit 
barrier diminishes. 
12  It remains to be seen what dynamic performance features quasi-contestability achieves with 
other types of sunk investment than R&D (Subsection 2.2.3)_ COMPETITION AND MARKET PERFORMANCE  133 
investment options:  S,/=S* and S=S*.  For the sake of comparison, take the 
discrete choice of S = 0 or S = S*. 
Consider a representative incumbent firm and potential entrant which both 
face nonbinding  productive capacity.  Both have to deal with the investment 
decision  in view of the payoff matrix that indicates the profit combinations 
depicted  in  Table  5  (calculated  over  both  markets;  that  is,  assuming  a 
reciprocal entry threat). Equilibrium (A) gives pure-contestability, since sunk 
cost  is  zero  (Table  1);  equilibria  (B)  and  (C)  indicate  non-contestability, 
because  sunk  cost  is  asymmetric (Figure  1);  equilibrium  (D)  reflects  quasi- 
contestability as both rivals are at par in terms of sunk investment (Figure 2). 
(Note that the case where (i) si4:s e, (ii) si¢s * and (iii)  seg=s * is redundant: 
then,  one rival outpaces the other, which indicates non-contestability.) 
The  game  is  different  for  E=0  and  E>0,  respectively.  First,  quasi- 
contestability is a weak and nonunique equilibrium in pure strategies if E = 0. 
Exit may be costless  for S= 0 ¢ S*.  Zero sunk cost gives a  zero exit cost.  If 
E= 0,  both non-contestability (si= S* and se= 0 or vice versa: equilibria (B) 
and  (C))  and  quasi-contestability  (si=se=s*:  equilibrium  (D))  are 
equilibrium  outcomes  in  pure  strategies.  For example,  both  monopoly out- 
comes are sustainable, since neither the expelled firm nor the monopolist has an 
incentive to change strategy: both innovation  and noninnovation  give a zero 
payoff. The non-contestable and quasi-contestable equilibria are weak and im- 
ply coordination difficulties (Rasmusen 1989, pp. 35-37):  which rival (if any) 
will monopolize the sunk investment? A  coordination mechanism is needed to 
select an equilibrium (for instance, through ex ante communication). However, 
quasi-contestability is a unique equilibrium outcome in mixed strategies. Even 
the smallest probability of being a monopolist (f, which is the likelihood that 
the rival firm decides not to invest S*) induces  decision to invest optimally: 
(1 -f). E+f. M=f. M>0  for E=0  and any f> 0. 
Secondly,  if E>O,  quasi-contestability  (Si-Se=S*>O  and  zero  profit to 
both  firms)  constitutes  a  unique  Nash  equilibrium  which  follows  from 
dominating strategies. That is, both firms are inclined to invest optimally, not- 
withstanding the zero profit. The reason is simple: the investment strategy S* 
yields at least as much payoff as when efficient investment is abandoned, while 
negative profits (i.e., exit) are avoided.  The quasi-contestable  equilibrium  is 
strong, since the associated strategies are best replies no matter what the rival 
is doing.  Moreover, this equilibrium is also the maximin solution. E  may ex- 
TABLE 5 -  SUNK INVESTMENT AND EXIT COST 
Potential entrant 
s~:s*  s6  s~ 
Incumbent firm  SD~S*  (0,0)  (A)  (-E,M)  (B) 
S~ -  S~  (11//, -E)  (C)  (0, O)  (D) 134  A. VAN WITTELOOSTUIJN 
ceed zero for two reasons. First, for S = 0 the expelled firm may face an exit cost 
(which may be arbitrarily close to 0) which only entails the burden indicating 
that firms (weakly) prefer zero-profit production to exit. This is the assumption 
that  also  explains  the  uniqueness  of  the  pure-contestability  equilibrium 
(subsection  2.1.2).  Second,  E>0  if S*~S>0.  If one firm invests  optimally 
while the other does not [si= S* and Seg=S * or vice versa: equilibrium (B) or 
(C)), then the innovating firm is able to push aside the noninnovating rival so 
that the expelled firm fails to amortize its sunk costs. 
5  APPRAISAL 
The examples of the second-stage subgame on price in section 3 predict static 
efficiency even  for  cases  with  positive  sunk  (and  exit)  cost.  The  first-stage 
subgame on investment in section 4 indicates conditions which induce the in- 
troduction of dynamic efficiency for the case of innovation. This combination 
describes cases of quasi-contestability.  Quasi-contestability (just as workable 
competition) is  an  umbrella notion  that  covers all scenarios  which  generate 
favorable performance (Maks  1986;  Van Witteloostuijn  and Maks  1988;  and 
Van Witteloostuijn  1990a).  So, as workable competition, quasi-contestability 
is  defined with  regard  to its  performance.  Quasi-contestability is associated 
with market conditions that induce incumbent firms' behavior which gives in 
to both static and dynamic efficiency considerations.  Quasi-contestability of- 
fers a formal microfoundation to a workability concept by introducing sunk in- 
vestment  in  a  contestability  framework.  This  means,  first,  that  a  case  of 
intermediate  competition  is  framed  and,  second,  that  contestable  market 
theory is transformed into a dynamic benchmark. 
Existing models of perfect contestability deal with the case where sunk in- 
vestment  and  exit  cost  cannot  occur  (Schwartz  and  Reynolds  1983;  and 
Shepherd  1984).  The endogenization  of innovations  (i.e.,  R&D activity) re- 
quires the introduction of sunk costs, since R&D cost can generally not be (ful- 
ly) recouped outside the market (Stiglitz  1987).  Hence, in  order to introduce 
firms' sunk investment in a free entry framework, firms can undertake invest- 
ment that  is  associated  with  a positive sunk  cost.  The sunk cost can give a 
positive  exit  cost  if  exit  occurs  before  the  sunk  cost  is  fully  amortized. 
However, the pervasive fear of entry is retained as incumbent firms anticipate 
full-scale (i.e., replacing) entry through the response of (a) alert potential en- 
trant(s) from prototype markets which will take advantage of any profit oppor- 
tunity by entering the incumbents' market, notwithstanding the sunk nature of 
investment. 
The key point is that sunk capital can give an exit cost. This contradicts pure- 
contestability. Pure-contestability is compatible with investment, if the invest- 
ment cost not yet amortized can be recouped at any exit date.  That is, pure- 
contestability assumes that firms are always able to benefit from cost-effective 
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zero by assumption irrespective of the date of exit. This is not the case with 
quasi-contestability. If exit occurs before the sunk investment is fully amortiz- 
ed,  selling or alternative use of the sunk capital is not cost effective. That is, 
(part of) the investment cost is not fully recoupable outside the market. This 
means  that  (part  of) the  investment  cost  has  to  be recovered in  the  quasi- 
contestable market. 
By way of illustration  the conditions  that underlie  quasi-contestability are 
stated explicitly for the case where the entry threat ensues from existing poten- 
tial  entrants  which  either  are  inclined  to  refrain  from  dumping  strategies 
(subsection 3.2) or face binding capacity restrictions in a home market (subsec- 
tion 3.3).  The key assumption is that incumbent firms and potential entrants 
are at par (in terms of technology, product and sunk exit cost). Moreover, to 
simplify matters, the discount  factor is ignored.  The credible fear of hit-and- 
run entry can only be sustained if the innovating potential entrants are able to 
recover  precisely  the  investment  cost  in  a  home  market.  The  reason  is 
straightforward.  Suppose that potential entrants face the opportunity to cap- 
ture a  (gross) profit (re) 
T 
Jr t4=  ~  (P[-Vt)" Q~  (14) 
t-I 
in a home market. Hence, (gross) profit 7r H represents the opportunity cost of 
entry. 
Assume, first, that all potential entrants capture a ~rt4> S 0. This implies that 
potential entrants will only decide to enter when post-entry (gross) profits 7r e 
exceed  ~z H.  Hence,  incumbent  firms are able to  set  an entry-deterring  price 
(PC) without provoking entry, where P~ and associated Qt  L follow from 
T 
(ptL_ Vt). QL =  7r,q,  (15) 
t=i 
provided  that  firms  face  sunk  cost  parity.  Incumbent  firms  then  capture 
positive (net) profits, since rch'> S o (recall the assumption that S~= S~).  Sup- 
pose,  second,  that there  are full-scale  potential  entrants  facing  Trot< S 0.  An 
analogous  argument  indicates  that  the  incumbent  firms'  limit  price  is  now 
associated with negative (net) profits, which undermines the very incentive to 
innovate in the first place.  So, the usual (tacit) assumption that potential en- 
trants earn a zero net profit outside the market (section 2) is very important. 
However, this assumption only reflects a special case. In effect, it is the oppor- 
tunity cost of entry that matters. 
tt may be illuminating to compare the assumptions of the theories of pure, 
quasi  and  non-contestability.  The theories  of pure and  quasi-contestability, 
unlike that of non-contestability, are based upon the assumption of free entry. 
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TABLE  6  -  COMPARISON  OF ASSUMPTIONS 
Theory of  Assumptions 
competition 
Free entry  Costly exit 
Incumbents  Entrants 
Pure-contestability  Yes  No  No 
Quasi-contestability  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Non-contestability  No  Yes  Yes 
associated with costless exit for incumbent firms and potential entrants.  In a 
non-contestable  market potential  entrants  have to  overcome entry barriers, 
whereas both incumbent firms and potential entrants may face exit barriers. In 
a quasi-contestable market (prototype) potential entrants face free entry, while 
both incumbent firms and potential entrants may have to incur exit costs. The 
point is that in a non-contestable market, unlike in a quasi-contestable market, 
all potential entrants face barriers to entry that are higher than the exit barriers 
(which may even be absent). As Shepherd (1984) argues:  'If entry barriers are 
higher, then exit barriers do not matter' (Shepherd 1984,  p. 578). In Table 6 the 
assumptions are summarized. 
The distinction  of the three types of markets is worthwhile,  since they are 
associated with different implications for market behavior. In pure and quasi- 
contestable markets,  unlike non-contestable markets,  a  credible entry threat 
forces  incumbent  firms  to  satisfy  a  zero-profit  condition.  Existing  pure- 
contestable market models, however, unlike the quasi  and non-contestability 
frameworks,  fail  to  take  account  of  the  case  where  firms'  (innovative  or 
strategic  entry-deterring)  sunk  investment behavior can  occur.  The implica- 
tions are summed up in Table 3. 
Quasi-contestability theory is a quest for market conditions that generate in- 
centives to (incumbent and potential) suppliers to adopt careful pricing on the 
one  hand  and  to  innovate  and  satisfy buyers'  desires  on the  other.  Quasi- 
contestability offers a solution to the static-dynamic efficiency dilemma by in- 
troducing positive sunk and exit costs in a free entry framework. The force of 
rivalry from prototype potential entrants is crucial.  The credible entry threat 
disciplines the incumbent firms' behavior. This means that the source of poten- 
tial entry and the multimarket perspective are essential.  Quasi-contestability 
offers formal microfoundations for a workable competition concept. In doing 
so, the theory can be a welfare-theoretic yardstick for the evaluation of market 
rivalry. COMPETITION AND MARKET PERFORMANCE  137 
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Summary 
THEORIES OF COMPETITION AND MARKET PERFORMANCE 
An important issue in the theory of industrial organization involves the question of market per- 
formance. This paper deals with the static-dynamic efficiency trade-off. Theories of competition 
are reviewed and classified. The concept of workable competition offers a verbal listing of condi- 
tions facilitating both efficiency  dimensions. A crucial feature of workable competition is the force 
of potential rivalry.  The study of sources of potential entry and market games identifies cases of 
intermediate competition which can serve as a welfare-theoretic yardstick for the evaluation of 
market performance. The nature of multimarket competition proves to be essential. 